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CONCENTRATIONS IN DIGITAL SECTOR 




Digital technologies are one of the most important factors driving the current EU to 
revise its competition rules, inter alia in an area as sensitive to corporate strategies 
as mergers and acquisitions. The European Commission and a number of indepen-
dent experts have already identified several key problems that the online environment 
raises for the application of traditional merger control institutes. Among them the 
takeovers of promising start-ups, that have already attracted millions of users to 
their freely distributed application, by some of the major online world players. They 
are sometimes referred to as “killer acquisitions” and they could even not to come 
under the authority of the European Commission because the EU Merger Regulation 
turnover criteria are not achieved. Should other criteria be chosen, or would such 
take-overs rather be controlled ex-post and under the risk of a de-concentration be-
ing ordered? The Commission is coming up with the first outlines of an answer. Its 
search for a response to these merger control challenges should be closely monitored 
by corporate practice, as it will set future boundaries for corporate strategies in the 
markets of tomorrow. The paper tries to structure the main challenges and possible 
EU law answers to the issue to predict what undertakings must be ready for when 
contemplating their future strategies for European markets.
KEYWORDS: EU control of concentrations, jurisdictional criteria, turnover 
thresholds, killer acquisitions, referrals of cases
*  Václav Šmejkal, ŠKODA AUTO University, Mladá Boleslav, Czech Republic; vaclav.smej-
kal@savs.cz.
Intereulaweast, Vol. VII (2) 2020
2
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Commission is currently conducting an „Evaluation of proce-
dural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control“.1 This operation started 
already in 2016 (!) and since then has periodically attracted attention among 
businesses, their legal experts, and at moments also of general media and pol-
iticians, especially when a high profile merger was stopped by the Commis-
sion.2 After lengthy consultations, the Commission has promised to lead this 
process to its provisional end and to publish its findings and proposals in a 
Staff Working Document scheduled for the middle of 2021. 
Potential changes in the current EU Merger Regulation (EUMR)3 have been 
evaluated from different angles, however, one of the aspects became recently 
more prominent than others. It is “the assessment of acquisitions of nascent, 
innovative companies by strong incumbents,… sometimes called killer acqui-
sitions, implying that the incumbents are acquiring the targets solely to dis-
continue and thus effectively kill their innovation projects to pre-empt future 
competition”.4 European start-ups, especially among internet innovators, are 
seen as potential victims of such kind of acquisitions, be it for the sole reason 
that on the TOP 20 list of global internet giants are currently only their US, 
Chinese and Japanese competitors.5 
This relatively well-known problem was recently lifted into the spotlight by 
the announcement of the Commission’s Executive Vice-President and Com-
missioner for competition, Margrethe Vestager, made in her September 11, 
2020 speech at the Annual Competition Conference of the International Bar 
1 European Commission, Competition, Public consultations, [https://ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/consultations/2016_merger_control/index_en.html], accessed on 12/10/2020. 
2 Most notably after the Commission prohibited Alstom acquisition by Siemens in February 
2019 the French and German ministers proposed to subjugate the Commission ś merger scru-
tiny to a political supervision of the Council of EU ministers. See in Picquier, M. A., Christol, 
R. France: Refusal of The Alstom/Siemens Merger - The French And German Governments 
Publish A “Manifesto” For the Modification of Merger Control. Mondaq.com March 27, 2019, 
[https://www.mondaq.com/france/antitrust-eu-competition-/792306/refusal-of-the-alstom-
siemens-merger-the-french-and-german-governments-publish-a-manifesto-for-the-modifica-
tion-of-merger-control], accessed on 12/10/2020.
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings. OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1–22.
4 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee: Start-
ups, killer acquisitions and merger control – Note by the European Union DAF/COMP/
WD(2020)24, 11 June 2020, p. 2
5 See List of Largest Internet Companies in the World (Ranked by Revenue), July 28, 2020, 
[https://www.markinblog.com/largest-internet-companies/], accessed on 12/10/2020.
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Association.6 She announced that the Commission intended to change its ap-
proach to so-called referrals of merger cases from the Member States to Com-
mission under Article 22 of EUMR so that the potential killer acquisitions, 
which would normally escape usual merger scrutiny, fall under the Commis-
sion ś review. Five short paragraphs of her speech raised a wave of reactions 
warning that the proposed solution may become a nightmare for companies. 
The following text is dedicated to the issue and treats it in two stages. First, it gives 
a broader picture of the killer acquisition problem and its possible solutions and, 
second, it discusses what would mean a new reading and usage of Article 22 of 
EUMR referrals´ regime for companies planning mergers or acquisitions within 
the EU or the EEA (European Economic Area). It aims to answer the questions 
of whether the easiest change of the status quo to achieve is really a good solution 
to the problem and what future developments businesses can expect.
2. EUMR RULES, “KILLER ACQUISITIONS” AND POTENTIAL 
SOLUTIONS TO THEM
Competition law understands killer acquisition as “a particular variation on 
the more general ‘loss of potential competition through the acquisition of a 
nascent firm’ theory of harm.”7 Such an acquisition triggers the loss of not only 
a competitive constraint, but also of a product, a technology, or an idea that 
could have had increased welfare. Therefore, it poses a danger to the efficien-
cy of markets, especially in high-tech, innovative sectors. However, not every 
acquisition of a recently created company has such consequences, and compe-
tition theory must specify the conditions under which a real killer acquisition 
takes place. Before any such theory can be put into practice the competition 
authorities must get a legal instrument and framework for its application. In 
essence, these should be merger control rules. However, the current EU rules 
contain jurisdictional criteria that do not give the Commission much opportu-
nity to intervene against potential killer acquisitions.
The EUMR regime, i.e. the Commission ś power to review a merger, is nor-
mally applicable to concentrations „with a Community dimension“.8 The goal 
6 Vestager, M. The future of EU merger control. Speech at International Bar Association 24th 
Annual Competition Conference, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/
vestager/announcements/future-eu-merger-control_en], accessed on 12/10/2020.
7 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee: Start-
ups, Killer Acquisitions and Merger Control – Background Note by the Secretariat DAF/
COMP(2020)5, 10-12 June 2020, p. 2. 
8 See art 1 of EUMR, op. cit. note 3. 
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is to limit the preliminary compulsory review of concentrations only to those 
which „may significantly impede effective competition in the common market 
or in a substantial part of it.“9 Whether a concentration has such a potential 
depends on the turnover worldwide and also in the EU or in each of at least 
three Member States… of all undertakings concerned or at least of each of at 
least two of the undertakings involved in the concentrations. The lowest (alter-
native) threshold is currently set in a way that the aggregate EU-wide turnover 
of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 
million, and in each of at least three Member States, the aggregate turnover 
of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 25 
million. Killer acquisitions, however, usually target promising technological 
start-ups, which for the time being have a minimal turnover, but are attractive 
for a technological solution that they have already managed to make desired, 
but not yet profitable.
The EUMR is anchored in a pre-digital world when the focus on turnover 
criteria was justified. It confers on the Commission the power to control only 
mergers that are structurally significant for the EU’s internal market because 
they involve two or more firms with a significant market position there. Thus, 
under Article 1 of the EUMR, a non-EU giant online platform taking over 
an IT “dwarf” is not obliged to notify the Commission of its intention, as 
the EUMR is not applicable to this type of acquisition. It means that there 
will be no authoritative assessment of the effects of that type of transaction 
on intra-EEA competition, as there is currently no legal instrument that the 
Commission itself would be empowered to use. The only existing option is to 
transfer the assessment of a locally important merger, usually falling within 
the competence of a particular Member State, to the European level, which the 
EUMR allows under the conditions set out in Article 4 (5) and Article 22 (and 
will be discussed further on).
There are other, more direct ways of remedying the situation that can be con-
sidered. It is possible to change the turnover criteria set by the EUMR. Article 
1(4) and (5) of the EUMR provides for a mechanism for their updating. These 
paragraphs confer to the Council the power to change the size of the turnover 
thresholds by a qualified majority vote, acting on a proposal from the Com-
mission. The wording of these paragraphs however suggests that such changes 
of turnover thresholds („on the basis of statistical data that may be regularly 
provided by the Member States“) should rather reflect the inflation rate or the 
graduate expansion of companies´ turnovers. It is more than doubtful, that this 
update could be used to expand the scope of the EUMR application, i.e. of the 
9 See EUMR op. cit. note 3, preamble, para 5. 
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Commission ś power to control entirely new categories of concentrations. All 
substantive changes of the EUMR require the unanimity vote in the Council as 
this legislation takes the Art 352 TFEU as its legal basis. In any case, such an 
option remains entirely theoretical, as pushing down the turnover thresholds 
could destroy the system as not just 400 or so concentrations per year10, but 
dozens of thousands of them would have to be notified to the Commission… 
Logically, therefore, the question arises of what other criteria would be offered 
to determine the Commission’s competence to examine a concentration poten-
tially relevant to the European position in the online market.
It would certainly be possible not to demand a certain turnover from all or 
at least two participants in the transaction, but only from one of them, usu-
ally from the acquiring one. It is a concept not unknown in the world, its 
examples can be found in Albania, or in Latin America, Brazil, or Colombia 
for instance.11 At first glance, the solution seems to be very suitable, given 
that it would make it possible to capture exactly the takeovers when a foreign 
company, with a turnover sometimes higher than the GDP of a number of EU 
member states, buys a promising European star-up.12 However, maintaining 
the EU-local nexus would require that the acquiring company (if not the ac-
quired one) has a certain turnover in the EU, which excludes from the notifi-
cation obligation, for example, a Chinese corporate giant entering EU markets 
through its first acquisition. Therefore, the criterion of a certain significance of 
the acquired company for the EU would always have to be added. This means 
supplementing the turnover criterion with other criteria, or, more straightfor-
wardly, by identifying the sensitive sectors in which any acquisition of a “small 
enterprise by a large enterprise” must always be notified. 
10 In the years 2014–2019, the number of assessed mergers reached 2,000, although only 
about 1/50 of them advanced to the second in-depth assessment phase. See in Vollarejo, C. M.: 
The legacy of Commissioner Vestager and a peek into the future. Speech at Am. Cham. EU ś 
competition policy conference. Brussels, October 12, 2019. 
11 Merger Control Thresholds by Practical Law. Thomson Reuters 2020, [https74://uk.practi-
callaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-557-0145?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&-
firstPage=true#co_pageContainer], accessed on 12/10/2020. Pardo, G. I.; Osorio, S. Colombia: 
Merger Control Laws and Regulations 2020, [https://iclg.com/practice-areas/merger-con-
trol-laws-and-regulations/colombia], accessed on 12/10/2020. 
12 Amazon ś annual revenue for 2019 was USD 280.522 billion, Google ś annual revenue 
for the same year was USD 160 billion, while the GDP of Czechia was USD 246.49 billion, 
of Portugal USD 236 billion, of Hungary USD 170 billion, of Slovakia US 105.42 billion and 
examples of all smaller Central and South-eastern European economies may follow. [https://
www.statista.com/statistics/266206/googles-annual-global-revenue/] ; [https://www.statista.
com/topics/846/amazon/] ; [https://tradingeconomics.com/], all accessed on 12/10/2020. 
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This would add a sector-specific criterion of merger review and a question 
then could arise whether not to copy the Norwegian solution where specified 
firms must notify all mergers.13 Without such sectoral limitation, there could 
be a sharp increase in notifications, as many new takeovers by companies with 
high turnover would have to be notified to the Commission. This new power 
of review should thus better be applied only in high-tech fields such as ICT or 
pharmacy, where the danger of killer acquisition is most often mentioned. An 
alternative solution, consisting, for example, in setting the turnover criterion 
so high that it captures only acquisitions made by companies from the global 
TOP 100, would probably not be able to identify all potential killer acquisi-
tions. In any case, such a change would have to be approved unanimously by 
the Council, making the intention difficult to implement politically.
An alternative jurisdictional criterion would be the value of the transaction. 
A buyer willing to pay a high purchase price for a company generating a neg-
ligible turnover indicates the importance it attaches to the acquired idea or 
technology. Such a criterion has already been introduced into national leg-
islation of Germany or Austria and is being applied there in practice.14 Here 
too, however, it must be acknowledged that quantifying the ‘true value’ of a 
transaction may not be without difficulty, as M. Vestager also stressed: „…it’s 
not easy to set a threshold like that at the right level.“15 For instance, the de-
termination of the valuation moment may cause significant difficulties too due 
to the volatility of exchange rates or stock prices. The inclusion of a relatively 
low transaction value in the regulation would surely provide a more reliable 
capture of all mergers that threaten the chances of European technology start-
ups to grow to transnational proportions. This value-based criterion, however, 
will never be able to decide on its own, as a qualified local nexus to the EU 
would be missing. Without it, there would be a need to notify the Commission 
of any major corporate purchase anywhere in the world. It would lead to a sig-
nificant increase in the number of notified concentrations. This would place a 
new burden not only on the Commission but also on the merging companies.16 
13 See in OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, op. cit. note 7, p. 41. 
14 For instance, in Germany the transaction value threshold is laid down as follows: i) Com-
bined worldwide turnover over EUR 500 million, ii) One undertaking concerned had a turn-
over exceeding EUR 25 million within Germany, iii) Transaction value amounts to more than 
EUR 400 million, iv) The target has significant activities in Germany (local nexus). See in 
Muhlbach, T.; Boss, A.: Germany: Merger Control Laws and Regulations 2020 [https://iclg.
com/practice-areas/merger-control-laws-and-regulations/germany], accessed on 12/10/2020. 
15 Vestager, M. op. cit. note 6. 
16 The German experience from 2017 on has so far shown that the number of notified trans-
actions has not radically changed. The local nexus consisting in significant activities of the 
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Therefore, the expert report Competition Policy for the digital era, issued by 
the Commission in 2019, recommends not to change the turnover criterion of 
the EUMR and rather to better evaluate how many serious acquisition cases 
really escape the Commission, as well as to watch the experience of Germany 
and other countries with the new jurisdictional criterion.17 This change to the 
EUMR would require difficult unanimous approval by the EU Council. There-
fore, M. Vestager pushed this most frequently mentioned option aside in her 
September 2020 speech: „So right now, changing the merger regulation, to add 
a new threshold like this, doesn’t seem like the most proportionate solution.“18
Some EU Member States (e.g. Spain), as well as non-EU countries (UK, Can-
ada, New Zealand, United Arab Emirates, Singapore), include among the ju-
risdictional criteria the combined market share of the merging companies, 
or their share of sales of goods or services of a particular description.19 In 
this way, it is really possible to control the situation where a company with a 
significant market position buys a much smaller company. For the definition 
of such a criterion, it would be decisive how the market concerned would be 
defined, whether as an EU / EEA territory without further specification or as a 
so-called relevant market, which is limited to existing and potential competi-
tion with a certain product in a certain territory. The first option may provide 
legal certainty but capture too many acquisitions albeit not those where a large 
foreign-based company firstly enters the EU market through the acquisition of 
a local start-up. The second option would cause even bigger problems. Given 
the Commission’s tendency to define relevant markets in the ICT sector as 
relatively narrow ones, a killer acquisition targeting an emerging technology 
market where the buyer is not yet present would not need to be notified at all 
on the basis of this criterion. Besides, there are pitfalls to correctly defining 
the relevant market and its market shares. A safer solution would thus be a 
criterion linked only to a certain type of goods or services and the share of 
their sale in the EU / EEA (i.e. once more a sector-specific regime of control). 
Either way, even here, changing the EUMR would require a unanimous vote 
in the Council.
Another possible solution is also difficult to implement: the introduction of 
ex-post controls of those mergers where there is a marked disparity between 
the turnover and the purchase price of the business being acquired. This possi-
acquired company in the German territory is required. See in OECD Directorate for Financial 
and Enterprise Affairs, op. cit. note 7, p. 40. 
17 Crémer, J.; de Montjoye, Y.-A.; Schweitzer, H.: Competition Policy for the digital era - Fi-
nal report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, p. 10, 113-115. 
18 Vestager, M. op. cit. note 6. 
19 Merger Control Thresholds by Practical Law. Thomson Reuters 2020. Op. cit. note 11. 
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bility is actively promoted, for example, by the French Competition Authority, 
pointing to the experience of several countries, including the United Kingdom 
(also Hungary, Ireland, Sweden, Lithuania, USA, Japan…) in ex post control 
of mergers, which have not been notified to the Authority.20 An indisputable 
advantage would be the elimination of heuristic difficulties on the part of the 
competition authorities, which, instead of modeling future impacts, could for 
some time purposefully monitor the behavior of the merged company and the 
market reaction to it. Uncertainty would, of course, increase on the part of the 
merging companies. However, the question (as the French authors point out21) 
is how different it would be from the uncertainty which undertakings already 
have as to the infringement of the prohibition of cartels under Article 101 
TFEU, or abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU, which are 
also assessed ex-post.22 
The ex-post control could be limited to large system players in order not to 
increase the administrative burden in general (i.e. again a variation on the 
aforementioned Norwegian solution), and the revocation of their concentration 
would be possible only within a specified time limit.23 However, the proposal 
raises ambiguities regarding the definition of ex-post control conditions, for 
example, the crucial question is whether to limit it to only cases where ex-ante 
control has not been carried out, i.e. whether it is to be understood as a safe-
guard against control evasion due to non-exceeding of turnover criteria. In any 
case, this also would be a change requiring an unanimously voted revision 
of the EUMR, so it is far more likely to be introduced first in some Member 
States and then evaluated by both other Member States and the EU. 
In the end, some authors speculate quite radically about the possibility of com-
bining the proposed criterion of the value of the transaction with the reversal 
20 See Controle ex-post en matiere de controle des concentrations: avantages & inconvenients. 
Concurrences – Antitrust Publications & Events. October 16, 2019, [https://www.concurrenc-
es.com], accessed on 12/10/2020. 
21 Perrot, A.; Blonde, V.; Ropars, A.; Catoire, S.; Mariton, H.: Rapport: La politique de la con-
currence et les intérets stratégiques de l´UE. République Francaise, Ministere de l´économie 
et des finances, Avril 2019. 
22 Article 6 of the EUMR allows the Commission to revise ex post a merger decision, but only 
in cases where undertakings have provided incorrect information or breached the conditions 
governing the authorization of a concentration.
23 Interview with Etienne Chantrel, Head of Mergers Unit, Autorité de la concurrence, Paris. 
Concurrences – Antitrust Publications & Events. Decémbre 6, 2019, [https://www.concur-
rences.com], accessed on 12/10/2020. E. Chantrel also recalls that, under Clayton’s Act, it is 
possible to revise merger results in the United States without a time limit. In other jurisdiction 
the intervention must take place within four or maximum twelve months from the merger. 
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of the burden of proof.24 At present, according to Article 2 of the EUMR, it is 
the Commission that assesses and declares a concentration compatible or in-
compatible with the internal market, i.e. the Commission bears the burden of 
proof if it wishes to prohibit a concentration. According to the proposal, which 
would also require unanimous support in the Council, there would be a rebut-
table presumption of incompatibility with the internal market against high-
cost acquisitions. And it would be up to the undertakings concerned to prove 
that there is no threat to competition. Something similar already exists in the 
US, Canada, Japan, and at the Member State level in Germany and Sweden. 
This is undoubtedly an elegant solution, although its effects may also be am-
biguous. Indeed, the Commission would not suffer from information asymme-
tries, as it does today when it must decide on the possible future development 
of technology markets on the basis of information obtained primarily from 
their players. On the other hand, the burden of proof for companies in dynam-
ically changing technological fields could be too heavy, as not all types and 
aspects of harms to competition by which the Commission would measure 
the evidence presented are sufficiently defined. The Commission is not yet in 
a position to announce all applicable theories of harm in advance, as this is a 
very novel and lively issue, especially in the online environment, depending 
on the development of new markets, business models, and their progressive 
analysis. Even at the national level, there are still not enough cases of bans on 
concentrations in online markets, from which it would be possible to conclude 
how serious and solvable the indicated problem is.
All the solutions discussed above have in common, besides their major or mi-
nor deficiencies, the need for a fundamental legislative change to the EUMR. 
This is a politically sensitive issue, as the Member States would have to agree 
unanimously to extend the powers of the European Commission and thus to 
its increased influence on the development of markets and their ‘champions’. 
On the other hand, the Commission cannot be sure that, in the context of the 
amendment of the EUMR, the Member States will resist the temptation to es-
tablish political control of its decision-making by the Council, as was already 
suggested.25 It is clear that the opening up of the legislative process entails 
considerable political risks in a situation when an ideal solution is not at hand, 
of which the Commission is surely aware. Probably, for this reason, as the most 
24 Motta, M.; Peitz. M.: Challenges for EU Merger Control. Discussion. Universitat Bonn – 
Universitat Mannheim: Paper N. 07 Collaborative Research Center Transregio 244, March 7, 
2019, [https://www.crctr224.de/en], accessed on 12/10/2020.
25 Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Energie, Ministere de l´économie et des finances. 
A Franco-German Manifesto for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st Century, [https://
www.bmwi.de], accessed on 12/10/2020.
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achievable solution, the Commission is currently proposing a more active use 
of Article 22 EUMR, and thus a more frequent referral of concentration cases 
from the national to the European level (discussed in the next chapter). The 
following table summarizes the political difficulty of reaching the solutions 
discussed and, in a way, also explains the attractiveness of the solution current-
ly being promoted by the Commission. 
Changes enabling the EC to review „killer acquisitions “ Amendment of EUMR needed
1. The turnover of only one party to the transaction as criterion YES
2. Introduction of transaction-value criterion YES
3. Existing or acquired market /sales share as a criterion YES
4. Reversal of the burden of proof regarding the (in)
compatibility of the concentration with the EU internal 
market
YES
5. Introduction of an ex post control of acquisitions in terms of 
their real impact YES
6. Introduction a sector-specific duty to review each merger YES
7. A new approach to the application of Art 22 EUMR NO
3. ARTICLE 22 EUMR – AN ANSWER HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT? 
Article 22 EUMR is historically called the “Dutch clause”, which explains 
its original raison d’être.26 Countries such as the Netherlands or, for example, 
Italy and Luxembourg, were countries without a national merger control sys-
tem at the time of the decision to adopt the first European Merger Regulation 
(4064/89), and there was a need to transfer mergers affecting competition in 
their markets to the European level. Consequently, under paragraph 1 of that 
Article any Member States „may request“ the Commission to examine the 
concentration that i) affects trade between the Member States, and ii) threatens 
to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State (or 
States) making the request. Logically, there is no condition that the requesting 
Member State must have the power to review the concentration under its na-
tional rules as the possibility of referral should exist especially for countries 
with no such rules. 
26 For explanation on art 22 EUMR and the system of referrals see in Rodriguez, J.: Merger 
Referrals under the EU Merger Regulation. An extract from 2011European Antitrust Review – 
a www.GlobalCompetitionReview.com Special Report. Ryan, S.A.: The revised system of case 
referral under the merger Regulation experiences to date. Competition Policy Newsletter. No 
3-Autumn 2005. 
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It is therefore relatively easy to fulfill criteria of the referral (concentration must 
be liable to have some discernible influence on the pattern of trade between the 
Member States and there should exist some prima facie evidence of its possible 
significant adverse impact on competition27), but only individual Member States 
can push the trigger if they want to. All the Commission can do is to „invite“ the 
Member State(s) to make a request if it has the information that a certain concen-
tration may fulfill the criteria for a referral.28 It happened already several times 
that some Member States referred „their“ case to the Commission while some 
others decided to deal with the concentration under their own national rules. It is 
thus important to stress that the Commission, taking over a concentration, deals 
with it on behalf of the requesting Member States. And those Member States 
only then lose their power to apply their national rules to the transaction, but not 
the other ones that did not refer the case to the Commission.29 
The possibility to avoid this multi-level review of a concentration is provided 
by the rule mentioned in paragraph 16 of the EUMR preamble: „Where a 
concentration capable of being reviewed under the competition laws of three 
or more Member States is referred to the Commission prior to any national 
notification, and no Member State competent to review the case expresses its 
disagreement, the Commission should acquire exclusive competence to re-
view the concentration and such a concentration should be deemed to have 
a Community dimension. Such pre-notification referrals from Member States 
to the Commission should not, however, be made where at least one Member 
State competent to review the case has expressed its disagreement with such 
a referral.“ So it is possible to rescue the „one-stop-shop“ principle governing 
normally the review of concentrations (i.e. either the European or the national 
review not the two at the same time), but the condition is that no Member State 
competent to review the concentration disagree with the referral of it. So, in 
any case, the Commission cannot attract the cases from the national level at its 
own will and declare it of importance for the EU as a whole. 
Art 22 EUMR then lays down the time periods within which the request have 
to be made and the Commission has to decide whether it will examine the 
27 Commission Notice on Case Referral in respect of concentrations (2005/C 56/02), paras 
42-44. 
28 See Art 22(5) EUMR, op. cit. note 3. 
29 Only exceptionally the Commission will examine the effects of the concentration in the ter-
ritory of not requesting Member States because such examination will prove to be necessary for 
the assessment of the effect of the concentration within the territory of the requesting Member 
States (i.e. in cases where the geographic relevant market would extend beyond borders of the 
requesting Member States). This however means that information can be requested from the 
non-referring Member States but not the compulsory referral of the case to the Commission. See 
in Commission Notice on Case Referral in respect of concentrations (2005/C 56/02), footnote 45. 
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case (which is important for requesting Member State as well as for compa-
nies concerned) and explains that the Member States where the concentration 
does not have to be notified must act (within 15 days) from the moment when 
the transaction has been only „otherwise made known to them“.30 This means 
that companies looking for certainty, if they cannot themselves try to transfer 
their concentration to the Commission under conditions of art 4(5) EMUR 
(compulsory review in at least three Member States31), then should informally 
approach all national competition authorities of Member States where they can 
reasonably expect some interest in their projected merger. An opposite alterna-
tive for them would be to hurry up and complete their otherwise non-notifiable 
merger before any referral from any Member State is made to the Commission. 
Because once the Commission decides to deal with the transaction, the stand-
still obligation applies, i.e. companies cannot proceed with their merger and 
must fulfill all their obligations under the EUMR review regime. 
Maybe to avoid such uncertainty that could precipitate companies to hasty 
deals the Commission wanted in 2014 (to no avail) to amend article 22 EUMR 
so that only the Member States competent to review a merger under their na-
tional rules can request a referral.32 But „the times they are a-changing’“ and 
in September 2020 the Commission calls the article 22 EUMR an answer to 
killer acquisitions „that is hiding in plain sight“ that allows without any legal 
changes to catch and review them at the EU level. M. Vestager acknowledged 
that „in recent years, the Commission has had a practice of discouraging na-
tional authorities from referring cases to us which they didn’t have the power 
to review themselves“, but from mid-2021 it would „start accepting referrals 
from national competition authorities of mergers that are worth reviewing at 
the EU level – whether or not those authorities had the power to review the 
case themselves.“33 
Statistics show that between September 21, 1990, and September 30, 2020, 
there were just 41 referrals from the Member States to the Commission and 
30 See Art 22(1) EUMR, op. cit. note 3. 
31 Art 4(5) EUMR allows to undertakings concerned to request the referral of their concen-
tration, which is capable of being reviewed under the national competition laws of at least three 
Member States, to the Commission. No Member States with the jurisdiction over the concen-
tration should disagree with that referral. If there is no objection the Commission acquires 
jurisdiction over the whole transaction as if it had the „Community dimension“ and no Member 
State can apply its own rules to it. 
32 Analysis of Commissioner Vestager’s announcement to accept referrals from NCAs for 
non-reportable concentrations. Antitrust Client Briefing published by Latham & Watkins, 18 
September 2020, [https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/article-22-eu-merger-referrals], ac-
cessed on 12/10/2020.
33 Vestager, M. op. cit. note 6. 
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in 4 cases only they were rejected by the addressee.34 Should we now expect a 
U-turn in the art 22 EUMR usage? 
Law firms in briefs published on their websites quickly identified new risks 
for their clients born by such change in the Commission ś approach.35 Before 
starting any discussion, it should be emphasized that the turnover or other 
thresholds are there to clearly separate cases when companies have the legal 
obligation to notify their mergers (and be ready to submit themselves fully to 
the scrutiny by the relevant authority) from the cases when they can merge 
without competition law brakes, formalities and sometimes also penalties. 
From mid-2021, however, they risk being required to fulfill all obligations un-
der EUMR even if following the thresholds relevant for triggering the EU or 
the national merger reviews, they should have not been required to do so. It 
would be enough if a Member State upon invitation by the Commission refers 
to it as a concentration that fulfills the loosely worded criteria of Art 22. 
From the companies´ point of view, this new Commission ś approach to Art 22 
EUMR usage would bring about the necessity to carefully verify whether their 
envisaged concentration might anywhere in the EU fulfill the conditions of art 
22 EUMR referral. They should beware that any Member State, even when 
the transaction is not to be filled under its national rules, may feel affected by 
the merger, and request the Commission. To be on the safe side the compa-
nies should themselves “make known” their intention to merge to all Member 
States that, based on the above-recommended verification, may be inclined 
to request the Commission. From that moment the companies could count 15 
working days within which the referral has to be made and within which they 
must freeze their transaction. Then if the referral is made and accepted, they 
would be lucky if all Member States affected by the concentration join the 
request addressed to the Commission and no one of them decides to review 
the transaction under its national rules. The companies will then have to pro-
ceed with quite a burdensome notification to the Commission. This could of 
course delay the transaction, which cannot be completed due to the standstill 
obligation. 
34 EU Open Data Portal. Merger Statistics, [https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/
mergers-statistics], accessed on 12/10/2020.
35 For instance: Kuhn, T.; Wienke, T.-M.; Jourdan, J.; Czapracka, K.: Catch-22: The Europe-
an Commission Keeps Broadening Merger Control Intervention Powers and Gives a Glimpse 
of the Future. Alert by White & Case September 17, 2020, [https://www.whitecase.com/pub-
lications/alert/catch-22-european-commission-keeps-broadening-merger-control-interven-
tion-powers], accessed on 12/10/2020. Wünschmann, C.; Ritz, C.; von Schreitter, F.; Schöning, 
F.: From „One Stop“ To „Full Stop“? Far reaching changes in EU merger control announced. 
Hogan Lovells, 21 Sep 2020, [http://hoganlovells-blog.de/2020/09/21/from-one-stop-to-full-
stop-far-reaching-changes-in-eu-merger-control-announced/#], accessed on 12/10/2020.
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All this looks rather unclear and uncertain by now. The Commission is expect-
ed to publish detailed guidance for companies and for Member States in which 
it would explain how to proceed within the limits of the present wording of art 
22 EUMR that would not be changed. Without such guidance “relying on na-
tional referrals may be unsatisfactory and insufficient“ even for the Commis-
sion as the experts who wrote the Competition Policy for the digital era report 
warned in 2019.36 The referrals to the EU level may be quite unpredictable for 
everybody and the whole system may even switch „from one stop to full stop“ 
if companies are deterred by the opacity of the new situation from considering 
their possible acquisitions or mergers.37 
CONCLUSION
The present analysis inevitably leads to a conclusion that the solution to the 
„killer acquisitions problem“, announced by the Commission in September 
2020, is so far burdened with many uncertainties and risks, especially for com-
panies. To be sure, no one argues that such type of acquisitions should pass 
unhindered by the EU competition law. Quite the contrary! It is the current 
Covid-19 pandemic that provided us with another evidence of our total depen-
dence on global online platforms and their communication applications. The 
competition policy and law undoubtedly have a role to play in that sector in 
order to keep it open, dynamic, consumer-friendly, and thus preventing „killer 
acquisition“ that would only strengthen its existing giants and close markets 
to new businesses and their ideas. However, the question remains whether the 
path indicated by the Commission is the right one, whether efforts to avoid a 
legislative change to the EUMR will not lead to an unsatisfactory result.
It is, of course, too early for a categorical conclusion. The Commission is un-
doubtedly examining now all the possibilities of interpretation of the existing 
legislation. It has a unique experience and intellectual capacity for this ex-
amination. Member States should consider their national solutions to remove 
uncertainty on the part of businesses. If potential killer acquisitions are com-
pulsorily notifiable according to the innovated rules of the Member States (in-
spired, for example, by the experience of Germany and Austria with the value 
of the transaction threshold), the uncertainty that a referral is requested by a 
Member State in which the transaction did not need to be notified will be re-
duced. Perhaps it is a smart step made by the Commission to intensify the de-
bate on possible changes by simply announcing a future U-turn in its approach 
36 Crémer, J.; de Montjoye, Y.-A.,; Schweitzer, H. op. cit. note 16, p. 113. 
37 Wünschmann, C.; Ritz, C.; von Schreitter, F.; Schöning, F. op. cit. note 35. 
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to art 22 EUMR. Businesses and experts will start calling for more clarity and 
certainty, which may put more and more pressure on finding better solutions. 
At the same time, it draws attention to all potential killer acquisitions from 
now on and may even discourage some predators from considering them.
Companies should stay vigilant and ask the Commission to guide their market 
behavior by clear and effective rules for the protection of competition. Perhaps 
they should rather lobby for a small change in the wording of the EUMR than 
look for an uncertain change in the Commission’s approach to using the possi-
bilities offered by Article 22 of the EUMR.
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